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Conceptions of human nature fall under two broad categories, trait bin accounts and trait 
cluster accounts. Trait bin accounts take there to be a special bin of traits, one composed 
of all and only those traits constituting our nature. For those arguing for a trait bin 
account of human nature, the challenge is to articulate what it is that marks a trait as 
being in or outside of the bin. For some, the bin is filled by the traits essential to being 
human. Others, such as Machery in his contribution to this volume, offer a non-
essentialist trait bin conception of human nature. In this chapter, I argue that trait bin 
approaches to human nature are misguided, that there is no good way of dividing human 
traits into those that are a part of our nature and those that are not. Instead, I argue for a 
trait cluster account, which sees human nature not as a special bin of traits, but as the 
relationship among traits. Under this account, human nature lies in the patterns of trait 
expression within and across human life histories. This account does a superior job 




Consider the mineral hematite, one of the chief sources of iron. What is the nature of 
hematite? One answer might involve reciting its formula, Fe2O3. This formula points to 
one of hematite’s invariant properties, its ratio of two iron atoms for every three oxygen 
atoms. But stopping at the molecular formula would be rather dissatisfying—it offers 
only modest help in distinguishing hematite from other minerals, especially ones that can 
appear similar, such as magnetite. Furthermore, because Fe2O3 can occur in various 
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polymorphs such as maghemite—which has a cubic crystalline structure, unlike the 
rhombohedral structure associated with hematite—Fe2O3 does not uniquely identify 
hematite. Manifest properties, such as its colour or texture, can add valuable information, 
though in this case they can vary significantly. Hematite can appear dull or lustrous, and 
its colour can vary from black to grey to pale orange. The highly variable nature of these 
properties undercuts their use in helping to identify hematite. What are more stable are 
properties that would be realized only given certain counterfactual situations. For 
example, one invariant feature of hematite is the colour of its streak. The streak colour of 
a mineral is the colour achieved by scraping it on a streak plate, which is standardly a 
piece of unglazed porcelain. Thus, part of the nature of hematite might consist in what we 
would achieve were we to abrade it on a streak plate. Many other properties are of this 
kind. Were we to heat a sample of the mineral, at what point would it melt? Hematite 
nature is thus about the evident properties samples of hematite bear, but also, and perhaps 
more importantly, it concerns properties that samples do not bear but possibly would bear 
if certain things were to happen to them.1 
Let’s label the possible things that can happen to hematite the ‘possible hematite 
lives’—the possible life histories that pieces of hematite could live, being crushed, 
weathered, heated, ground, suspended in water, etc. These possible lives will exhibit 
patterns from which generalizations can be drawn. If streaked, a red powder will appear. 
If heated to ~1,500 degrees centigrade, it will liquefy. We could thus imagine the set of 
possible hematite lives, and the properties of those lives. Lives that involve the property 
of being heated in excess of 1,500 degrees centigrade will result in the consequent trait of 
being a liquid; having a certain force applied will result in the sample being crushed, and 
so on. (These of course require certain “normal” background conditions to obtain, 
conditions that are implicit here but could be made explicit.) These generalizations are 
possible because of the patterns of traits that exist over the set of possible life histories. I 
suggest, therefore, that we can understand hematite nature as consisting in the clusters of 
traits dispersed over hematite possible life histories. Hematite nature is not a bin of traits, 
                                                
1 See, for example, http://geology.com/minerals/hematite.shtml for information on the 
properties of hematite.  
This is a preprint of a chapter whose final and definitive form is published in: E. Hannon and T. Lewens (eds) Why 
We Disagree about Human Nature, Oxford University Press. Please do not quote this version without permission. 
3 
but instead a set of relations among traits. Call this the ‘trait cluster account’ of hematite 
nature. 
The main claim of this article is that the trait cluster account is not just a good 
account of hematite nature, or mineral nature broadly considered, but also serves as an 
adequate account of human nature. In the case of hematite, it may be possible to describe 
its nature in terms of simple dispositions, where these traits are (largely) unmanifested 
dispositions. But when one considers biological organisms and their complex life 
histories, such dispositions will not work to capture the complex way in which traits are 
related to one another. Instead, a more nuanced understanding of trait patterns over life 
histories will be required. Rather than talking of a disposition to anger, say, it is more 
informative to take the trait of being angry and see which other traits it is related to and 
how they are related. My argument here for a life history–centred account of human 
nature is an expansion of my earlier (2013) proposal. In addition to articulating this 
account, I will draw out many of its implications and show how it enables conceptions of 
human nature to align with the human sciences. In defending the trait cluster framework, 
I will contrast it with the ‘trait bin’ approach, which characterizes human nature as a bin 
of traits instead of the relationships among traits. 
Both the trait bin and trait cluster accounts are responses to the felt need for a 
concept of human nature that avoids the perils of essentialism. As Hull (1986) noted, 
since biological species (including Homo sapiens) are not defined in terms of essences, 
we cannot use species essences to construct a concept of human nature. The conclusion 
Hull drew was a skeptical one; he was skeptical about the project of producing and using 
a concept of human nature. The trait bin and trait cluster accounts attempt to avoid the 
perils of essentialism, while retaining the concept of human nature. 
 
2. The trait bin account of human nature 
There are two fundamentally distinct approaches to understanding the relationship 
between human traits and human nature. One approach—the trait bin approach—holds 
that human traits fall into two mutually exclusive bins: the nature category and the other 
category (containing, say, cultural or learned traits). The second approach—the trait 
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cluster approach—takes human nature to consist not in a bin of traits, but in patterns of 
trait expression. The trait bin account will be considered here and the trait cluster account 
will be discussed in the following section. 
Essentialist views of human nature are trait bin accounts. They place in the nature 
bin the traits essential to our species. But one need not be an essentialist in order to 
defend the trait bin approach. There are criteria other than being considered essential that 
one can use to sort traits into the nature and other categories. In this section I will 
consider and critique a recent attempt at defending a nonessentialist trait bin account, that 
of Machery (2008, 2016, this volume). In so doing, I will not be suggesting that his 
conception is a poor rendering of the trait bin approach. Indeed, it is a clever attempt to 
save the trait bin approach from the problems of essentialism. Instead, my critique 
extends beyond Machery’s approach, showing that the trait bin approach itself is where 
the problems lie. 
Machery argues that we should retain the human nature bin, but define it in terms 
other than essences. His proposal is that “human nature is the set of properties that 
humans tend to possess as a result of the evolution of their species” (2008: 323). Thus, 
traits fall into the human nature bin just in case they occur in “most humans” (2008: 
323)—which I will understand to be more than 50 percent (though the precise percentage 
is not important for my critique)—and are a product of the evolution of our species. By 
“human,” he means humans now, not ones that existed in our evolutionary past or ones 
that will exist in our future. And by “the evolution of their species” he does not mean 
only the traits that arose in our species, that is, since the origin of our species’ lineage 
around two hundred thousand years ago. Instead, he means the evolution of our species as 
well as the species ancestral to ours. Thus, a trait like maternal care is, for Machery, in 
the human nature bin even though it preceded our species and is universal among 
mammals. The reasoning behind these criteria is that if human nature is meant to 
characterize humans, the included traits should be common. And by excluding traits not 
part of our evolution, Machery excludes traits “exclusively due to enculturation or to 
social learning” (2008: 326).2 Human nature is thus the common traits resulting from our 
                                                
2 I should note that Machery has modified his criteria in his contribution to this volume. 
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evolutionary heritage. 
There are many difficulties with these criteria. Although the 50 percent dividing 
line has intuitive appeal, many important human traits are possessed by a minority of 
humans. Women typically undergo menopause, and this appears to be a particularly 
interesting derived trait in our species. But because fewer than 50 percent of humans will 
undergo menopause, it is not part of human nature on Machery’s view. Applying this 
criterion to hematite, the orange streak it leaves on a streak plate will not be a part of 
hematite nature since only a tiny fraction of hematite in the world has undergone or will 
undergo a streak. Machery could, of course, bite the bullet and argue that just because the 
streak is an important diagnostic tool does not mean that it is a part of hematite nature. 
But it is not clear that this is a bullet we need to or should bite. 
The criterion that traits in the human nature bin must be a result of the evolution 
of our species and not “exclusively due to enculturation or to social learning” also has 
intuitive appeal. But which traits are exclusively due to enculturation or to social 
learning? Machery uses the example of the belief that water is wet: “the belief that water 
is wet is not part of human nature, in spite of being common, because this belief is not the 
result of some evolutionary processes. Rather, people learn that water is wet” (2008: 
327). Is Machery right that there is nothing related to the evolution of our species that 
helps explain such a belief? This is of course a difficult empirical question, but it does not 
seem outlandish to think that evolved cognitive capacities shared by the majority of 
humans are involved in the formation of such beliefs. But if this is true, it is hard to think 
of beliefs (or other human traits) that are “pure” and free of any evolutionary influence. 
While Machery (2008: 327) anticipates this difficulty in acknowledging that “it is 
probably correct that evolutionary processes causally contribute to the existence of any 
                                                                                                                                            
Partly in response to my (Ramsey 2013) earlier critiques, he has made his account closer 
to my life history trait cluster account: “it is natural to think that describing what human 
beings are like involves describing what they are like at the various life stages that 
constitute the life history of human beings” (Machery this volume: 000). And he also 
adds traits possessed not by individuals alone, but ones that “typical human groups tend 
to possess because of the evolution of their species” (000). These new additions, though 
improvements, do not undercut my critiques of the trait bin approach. 
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trait that is common among humans,” he does not answer the concern that there are deep 
problems inherent in trying to divide traits into two mutually exclusive categories, one 
due to evolution, the other not due to evolution. 
In his contribution to this volume, however, he addresses this issue. He argues 
that “the nomological account requires one be able to distinguish those traits whose 
distribution is explained by appealing only to individual or social learning from other 
traits, not traits whose development is only influenced by individual or social learning 
from other traits” (000, italics in original). This is a slippery move, since given the 
pragmatics of explanation, it is possible that in many cases, we will be satisfied with an 
explanation of a trait distribution that only appeals to learning. It nevertheless should be 
acknowledged that explanations of the distribution of traits can often benefit by pointing 
to evolved psychological traits. For example, we might notice that in the English 
language the more common words tend to have fewer syllables than rarer words. We 
might be satisfied in explaining this distribution in word size by pointing out that this was 
true of the previous generation and that the current generation learned their language for 
the most part from that generation. The distribution of words length is thus explained 
purely by learning. Though some may find this satisfying, I think that pointing to 
psychological features of our species (attention spans, abilities to remember long words, 
etc.) may be more insightful in explaining such a distribution.  
Another question concerns the criteria we should use to classify trait tokens into 
trait types. To say of a human behavioural token that it is part of an evolutionary process 
and has been a target of selection requires that this trait token be subsumed into a class of 
tokens that can be identified across generations. Machery uses the example of shame as a 
trait with an evolutionary history. Shame, of course, is manifested by particular shame 
tokens like “feeling shameful because of a failure to make the honour roll at school.” Is 
such a behaviour the result of an ultimate explanation? This depends on how one 
partitions traits. If the group of traits includes only ones involving shame about school-
related performance, then this is unlikely to have a selective history. That is, there was 
probably not a sequence of ancestors that exhibited this particular behaviour and received 
a fitness boost because of it. Instead, if we subsume such behaviour into a broader class 
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of traits that share a common etiology, in this case behaviours that are strongly connected 
to the emotion shame, then we might be able to offer an evolutionary account. Returning 
to the example of knowing water to be wet, the questions for Machery are to which class 
of traits this belongs, what unifies this class, and what justifies grouping the tokens into 
this class and not another? Once these questions are answered, we can ask whether the 
disposition uniting the tokens has been selected for. One intuitively subsumes shame-
laden behaviour into the shame-caused category, but what is the right category to 
subsume other traits like knowing water is wet? Machery needs to offer a framework for 
connecting trait tokens (token instances of shame or beliefs about water) with underlying 
dispositions before making his conclusion about which ones are the result of an 
evolutionary history. 
With Machery’s criteria, it is also difficult to know how to categorize quantitative 
traits (traits that can take on a range of values) instead of qualitative traits (traits an 
individual either possesses or does not). Take human height. Is it human nature to have a 
specific height? Heights have changed considerably over the past century or so, in part 
due to cultural (especially dietary) changes. In the Netherlands, for example, male height 
has increased by almost 13 percent since the mid-nineteenth century, a fairly dramatic 
increase (Schönbeck et al. 2013). A quantitative trait like height thus raises two problems 
for Machery. First, does the fact that each human has (measured at a very fine grain) a 
unique height mean that height is not a part of human nature? Second, does the fact that 
the environment (cultural or otherwise) plays an important role in the trait expression 
mean that it is not part of human nature? Since many important human traits are 
quantitative, it seems that they should not be eliminated from human nature. Thus, such 
questions pose deep problems for a trait bin account of human nature. A better approach 
to answering these questions would be to investigate the range of values of human height 
and the way these values are related to such things as diet. Such a way of understanding 
human nature is what will be argued for below. But first, let’s take stock of the critique of 
Machery’s position and what it implies for the tenability of a trait bin approach. 
Machery’s account was challenged based on how it attempts to sort traits into the 
human nature bin. His approach has problems generated by including only majority traits, 
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and by excluding traits that are clean of evolutionary influence. I suggest that it is not just 
Machery’s rendering of the trait bin approach that is problematic, but the approach itself. 
To see this, let’s step back and consider how traits come about. 
All human phenotypic traits are the result of development. They represent a 
complex interplay between our genes and environment (including our cultural 
environment), both of which have been passed down from our ancestors. Some traits are 
relatively well buffered against a range of differences in genes; others consistently 
develop over a wide range of environments. The degree to which environmental and 
genetic differences affect any particular trait can take on a wide range of values. 
Furthermore, the degree to which differences in properties of organisms can be linked to 
genetic differences critically depends on the background environment. Some 
environments set up organisms to be very sensitive to particular genetic differences, 
while other environments may render these genetic differences impotent. My suggestion 
is that if we consider the set of possible gene-environment combinations, and the traits 
that these generate, there is no justifiable, nonarbitrary way of sorting these traits into two 
bins, one bin of traits belonging to the nature of our species, the other bin of traits not so 
designated. Because of this, I hold that the trait bin approach to characterizing human 
nature should be abandoned. 
Machery’s response in this volume to this argument counters that the explanation 
of trait distributions is always contrastive and that some traits can only be explained in 
terms of social or individual learning: “To explain why some traits are typical one can 
appeal to ultimate causes; to explain why other traits are typical, one can only appeal to 
individual or social learning. The former, but not the latter, are part of human nature” 
(this volume: 000, italics in original). He provides an example of something that can only 
be explained in terms of social learning: 
 
For instance, if a few years ago most human beings had learned Psy’s song 
“Gangnam Style,” one would not provide a proper explanation of this 
explanandum by appealing to the evolution of the larynx and the vocal chords or 
the evolution of the human musical sensitivity (e.g., Mithen, 2005) since 
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evolutionary information would not be specific to the contrast between Psy’s song 
“Gangnam Style” and Carly Rae Jepsen’s “Call Me Maybe.” (this volume: 000) 
 
But how, I wonder, does Machery rule out explanations based on evolved traits? How 
any particular song spreads is going to be a function of such variables as the 
characteristics of the song and the underlying neurophysiology. Perhaps “Gangman 
Style” resonated with people more than “Call Me Maybe” because it stimulated our 
(evolved) limbic system in ways that gave us greater pleasure or excitement. Pointing this 
out may not be a very satisfying explanation, but it suggests that we cannot simply 
assume a priori that explaining the difference in song performance will never benefit 
from citing evolved characteristics. Similarly, another of Machery’s examples, why so 
many Americans know “The Star Spangled Banner,” surely at least in part involves 
(evolved) traits concerning tendencies to conform with those around you. Thus, while I 
agree that we are sometimes satisfied with explanations which point out that something 
was socially or individually learned, many times we want to go further, to know why one 
thing was learned and not another. 
In sum, the trait bin approach is subject to a host of problems. My solution for 
human nature, the trait cluster account, will be explored in the next section. 
 
3. The trait cluster account of human nature 
In Hamlin Garland’s autobiography, he notes that “to rob me of my memories of the 
circus would leave me as poor as those to whom life was a drab and hopeless round of 
toil. It was our brief season of imaginative life. In one day—in a part of one day—we 
gained a thousand new conceptions of the world and of human nature” (1917: 137). 
Circuses are known for their idiosyncratic characters and odd—if not bizarre—
behaviours. Thus, we are faced with a dilemma. Either Garland—and others who think 
we can learn about human nature by studying the full range of human behaviour—is 
wrong, or Machery’s trait bin approach is wrong and it is not the high frequency of traits 
across the whole species that is essential to human nature. 
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In this section, I articulate and defend what I call the trait cluster approach to 
human nature. This approach requires a gestalt shift in how human nature is understood. 
Traits are not taken to be within or outside of human nature. Instead, human nature lies 
within the patterns of expressions of the traits. To see this shift, consider how we would 
characterize the nature of a baseball. Under the trait bin approach—Machery’s version of 
it at least, which he labels the nomological account—we would look for properties that 
are frequent among baseballs and a part of baseball history. Traits included in the 
baseball nature bin might be spending most of their time sitting still indoors or being 
made of leather, since these traits, though not universal, are a part of the majority of 
baseballs. By contrast, the trait cluster approach does not hold that there is a bin of traits 
constituting baseball nature. Instead, the nature of a baseball lies in how it performs in 
various circumstances. When hit with a bat with a particular angle and velocity, how 
much is it deformed and how far will it travel? Baseballs do not act outside of their 
nature, but this does not mean that they do not have a nature, or that they have an overly 
permissive nature. Baseballs act in very specific, reliable ways given their particular 
environmental inputs, and it is their nature to do so. Paralleling the hematite example 
above, nothing samples of hematite do goes against hematite nature, but this does not 
mean that hematite nature is overly permissive or vacuous. Instead, hematite trait clusters 
are very specific and very informative in distinguishing hematite from other minerals and 
in explaining patterns of traits among samples of hematite. 
Before articulating in detail my account of human nature, let’s consider whether 
there have been other trait cluster conceptions of human nature. I will focus here on 
Griffiths (2009) and Cashdan (2013), since their views come the closest to my own by 
placing patterns of trait variation on centre stage. 
Griffiths argues that “the primary sense which should be attached to the term 
‘human nature’ is simply what human beings are like, not some cause that makes them 
that way. As such, human nature is primarily the pattern of similarity and difference 
amongst human beings” (2009: 53). Griffiths, here, is arguing against a hidden, inner 
nature that causes manifest traits. This argument is born out of his antiessentialism: it is 
simply false that each human contains within himself or herself the essence of our 
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species, and that this essence causes our behaviour. Griffiths, however, does not adopt 
Hull’s (1986) sceptical solution that there is no such thing as human nature, nor does he 
accept Machery’s solution of offering an antiessentialist trait bin account. Instead, for 
Griffiths, human nature is about patterns of similarity and difference among human 
beings. The account I will offer goes a bit further than this, taking human nature to reside 
not just in the patterns of similarity and difference across human beings, but also in the 
way traits are patterned within individual life histories. But before fleshing this idea out, 
let’s consider another trait cluster account, that of Cashdan. As she argues, 
 
because human nature evolved to be flexible in predictable ways, the task of 
understanding human nature requires that we understand how evolution shaped 
that variation. The assumption is not just that we evolved flexibly, but that 
selection shaped the nature and direction of that flexibility. To a behavioral 
ecologist, then, the predictable, patterned nature of that response is the universal 
we must understand. In this view, we cannot understand our universal human 
nature without understanding the variability in its expression…The concept is 
clarified by viewing variation as a norm of reaction—the pattern of expression of 
a genotype across a range of environments. (2013: 71) 
 
Cashdan thus holds that human nature consists not in a set of traits, but instead in patterns 
of trait expression. She is thus rejecting a trait bin account and endorsing the trait cluster 
approach. She is primarily interested in one kind of pattern: how genotypes are expressed 
differently over a range of environments. Understanding human nature, then, is based on 
understanding how evolution shaped our ability to flexibly and predictably adapt to 
different environments. While I agree with Cashdan that patterns of gene expression 
across environments are an important component of the trait cluster account of human 
nature, they do not exhaust human nature. 
One other account I should mention before introducing my version of the trait 
cluster account is that of Samuels (2012). He labels his view essentialist, but it is not 
essentialist in the way the term is standardly understood. As Samuels argues, “human 
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nature is a suite of mechanisms that underlie the manifestation of species-typical 
cognitive and behavioral regularities” (2012: 3). This view is in some ways not too far off 
from my own, since it concerns patterns of traits and the investigation of what underlies 
these patterns. But I don’t think that it is helpful to restrict human nature to mechanisms. 
First, this intertwines human nature with debates about what a mechanism is. Second, as 
Machery (2016) points out, if we want human nature to describe what we are like, we 
should not restrict human nature to mechanisms. Of course, Machery holds that one 
should instead offer a bin of traits, whereas I hold that one should be concerned with how 
the traits are associated. I will now describe in detail my version of the trait cluster 
account. 
I previously proposed a trait cluster account of human nature, which I labelled the 
life-history trait cluster (LTC) account because it is based on patterns of traits over sets of 
human life histories (Ramsey 2013). I will retain the ‘LTC’ label in order to differentiate 
my account from other trait cluster accounts like that of Griffiths and Cashdan. The idea 
behind the LTC account is this: Each individual human lives his or her life, and in so 
doing realizes a life history. This life history is their path through space and time and 
contains all the traits they have exhibited over their lifetime. The one life history that any 
particular human realizes is not the only way he or she could have lived over his or her 
life. Given the genes and the environmental arena in which the individual resides, there is 
a set of possible ways that he or she could have lived his or her life. (This is not a claim 
about indeterminism—instead one can speak of possibilities in deterministic systems, like 
possible games of pinball given possible starting states and game plays.) Each of these 
possible life histories can be understood as a four-dimensional structure, and this 
structure is populated with traits. These organismic traits can occupy the whole life 
history, but will frequently occupy only a subset of each life history. Having blood 
coursing through our veins is something each of us will have for our entire lives, unless 
we experience a cardiac arrest from which we are able to recover. And being asleep is a 
trait that we experience during roughly one-third of our life history, cycling on and off. 
Other traits, like adult teeth, are not inborn (though their buds are), but once we have 
them they usually stick around for the entire remainder of the life history. “Trait” in this 
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sense is thus used quite liberally; even a hiccup, sneeze, or yawn issued at a particular 
time is a trait. 
Let’s now examine how this set of life histories links up with human nature. It is 
clear that for any individual, while they have—at a fine grain of analysis—an immense 
number of possible lives that they can lead, the pattern of traits is nevertheless rather 
constrained (holding fixed their genes and the extant environmental arena3). They are 
constrained in the obvious sense that some traits simply cannot arise—no human will 
hibernate or sprout wings and fly—but there are subtler and more interesting constraints 
as well: Traits that are a part of at least some possible life histories (“possible lives” for 
short) will nevertheless be limited by such things as age and the sequence of preceding 
traits. Adult teeth erupt following (and not before) baby teeth; mothers lactate following 
(and not before) pregnancy; pregnancy only happens between menarche and menopause. 
While there may be exceptions to such generalizations, there are nevertheless patterns to 
how the traits are distributed over life histories. 
It is these patterns, and the generalizations we can derive from them, that 
constitute individual nature, the nature of an individual organism, that is. Similarly, the 
nature of a particular baseball is based on the possible ways it will behave over its life. If 
hit in certain sorts of ways, it will be propelled for long distances. If it is lost in the 
woods, it will slowly decompose, but will do so in a predictable way. If it is exposed to 
prolonged hot, dry weather, it will predictably form small cracks. Thus, we could map out 
the possible fates of the baseball, and note the pattern of trait expression over the set of 
possibilities. Such patterns, and the generalizations we can draw from them, constitute 
the nature of the ball. If the ball is hit but does not burst into flames, we can note that 
such a flight is not a part of this ball’s nature. The baseball’s nature can thus serve to 
explain its outcomes. 
Because of the laws of physics, especially under some interpretations of quantum 
mechanics, the ball has a nonzero probability to, for example, spontaneously jump from 
the pitcher’s hand to the top of her head. This behaviour is therefore within the ball’s 
                                                
3 If one does not hold these fixed, then it is no longer clear that it is human nature that is 
being articulated. More on this below.   
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nature, though it has such a small probability that it can be ignored. Similarly, the nature 
of an individual human will include countless highly improbable events. And, as with the 
ball, they can safely be ignored despite their inclusion within the individual’s nature. 
Let’s now define individual nature precisely: An individual’s nature is the pattern 
of its trait expression over its set of possible life histories. (Again, this is holding fixed 
the individual’s set of genes and environmental arena, and of course the laws of nature. If 
genes were allowed to vary, individual nature would be vacuous since sufficient changes 
to genes could, say, change an American into an aardvark. By contrast, varying the way 
that an individual encounters its environmental heterogeneity reveals something about its 
nature.) Individual nature thus includes both the patterns within individual life histories, 
as well as the patterns across those life histories. Individual nature, however, is not 
human nature; it is instead its foundation. Consider the individual nature of each human. 
If we were to combine the possible life histories from each individual’s nature, then we 
would have human nature: Human nature is the patterns of trait expression over the 
totality of extant human possible life histories. Because humans are an evolving 
species—not something with a static nature like a chemical element—human nature is 
restricted to extant humans (in the sense of extant genomes and sets of environmental 
variables). The benefit of this is that it allows human nature to change over time, and 
does not require of human nature that it take into account the deep past. 
This account of human nature—the LTC account—by concerning patterns of trait 
expressions, does not directly concern the actual frequency of traits. While the frequency 
of traits can serve as evidence for human nature, actual frequency per se is not 
definitionally linked to human nature, as it is in some trait bin accounts. I argued in the 
introduction that the natures of scientific kinds like hematite are best defined not in terms 
of the bin of traits that most pieces of hematite bear, but instead in terms of the patterns 
of expressions of the traits within the space of possible hematite lives. These patterns 
carry more information about the nature of hematite and are more helpful in 
distinguishing hematite from other, similar minerals. Hematite nature, and mineral nature 
broadly considered, are thus the subject of the mineralogical sciences. Scientists don’t 
just passively observe and tally the manifest properties of minerals; instead, they do 
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things to the minerals and see how traits like being bathed in hydrochloric acid are 
associated with changes in the mineral. And just as an LTC account of mineral nature 
allows mineral nature to be aligned with the mineralogical sciences, so does the LTC 
account of human nature allow for human nature to be aligned with the human sciences. 
But before arguing for a link between the LTC account of human nature and the human 
sciences, let’s step back and consider what roles human nature might be expected to 
fulfil, and whether the LTC account can fulfil them better than a trait bin account. 
 
4. What is human nature good for? 
I have argued that there is a concept of human nature, the LTC account, that does not fall 
prey to the same difficulties as trait bin accounts. But in order to see whether the trait 
cluster approach is truly superior to the alternatives, we must pause to consider what the 
concept of human nature is for, what use it can have. 
The fact that ‘human nature’ has currency in the academic and popular media 
urges us to respond in one of two ways. One way is to hold that ‘human nature’ is like 
‘phlogiston’—it is a term without a referent within the contemporary worldview. It 
should thus be discarded and replaced with one or more new concepts, just as phlogiston 
is now taken not to be a substance, but instead the absence of oxygen.4 Could human 
nature have a similar replacement? The problem with finding a replacement is that human 
nature does not play a specific, technical role in the sciences. It is less like a theoretical 
posit and more like a name for the general subject of the human sciences: human nature is 
the quilt and the various sciences concern patches on this quilt. If this is true, then we 
should pursue the second way of responding, which is to produce a clearer notion of what 
human nature is. Such a conception should (1) articulate the subject of the human 
sciences. In so doing, it might help to (2) characterize what human beings are like and 
may even be used to (3) causally explain what we are like. Other desiderata might include 
(4) articulating human limits, (5) distinguishing humans from other animals, and (6) 
providing normative insight about how humans should be. In what follows in this section, 
                                                
4 This is to gloss over the complexities of the case of phlogiston—see, for example, 
Chang (2009). 
This is a preprint of a chapter whose final and definitive form is published in: E. Hannon and T. Lewens (eds) Why 
We Disagree about Human Nature, Oxford University Press. Please do not quote this version without permission. 
16 
I will consider desiderata 1–3 to see which of these roles the LTC can play, and will 
compare the results to the roles played by Machery’s nomological account. For a 
discussion of 4 and 5, see Ramsey (2013); for a discussion of 6, see Ramsey (2012, 
2017). 
 
4.1. Human nature as the subject of the human sciences 
If human nature is not based on intuition or religious texts, but is instead based on what 
we do and how and why we do it, human nature should be aligned with the human 
sciences. We can thus consider human nature to be the subject of the human sciences. 
Thus, to see whether the LTC account of human nature is tenable—and superior to trait 
bin approaches—we should consider what the human sciences are after and what kinds of 
results they consider to be worthy of reporting. 
The human sciences are diverse and include such disciplines as psychology, 
sociology, anthropology, and economics. In comparing trait bin and trait cluster accounts, 
the task at hand is to see whether these sciences are primarily concerned with how traits 
are related to one another, and to see if the sciences restrict their domain of enquiry to—
in Machery’s rendering—traits that are possessed by the majority of humans and are due 
to human evolution. Let’s focus on one of the sciences, psychology. Machery’s (2008) 
paper was published in the journal Philosophical Psychology, and he certainly has 
psychology as a target science. Should we then conclude that psychological science 
centres on traits that are evolutionary products that the majority of humans possess? This 
is of course an empirical question, and the rigorous survey of psychology capable of 
decisively answering it is beyond the scope of this article. But to get a flavour for what 
psychology tends to focus on, let’s consider the subject matters of the papers the official 
journal of the American Psychological Society, American Psychologist, publishes, and 
whether they tend to concern the bin of traits identified by Machery as human nature, or 
instead associations among traits. 
For a sample, let’s examine the first article in each issue in volume 70 of 
American Psychologist (up to October 2015, which is the most recent volume at the time 
of this writing). The first article of issue 1 concerns the promises of qualitative inquiry, so 
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it does not directly bear on the matter of human nature. The second article of the issue, 
“Evaluating gender similarities and differences using metasynthesis,” concerns ways of 
evaluating how similar traits are across genders. This is clearly about trait clusters, and is 
not about the majority of traits that are products of our evolution. Moving on to issue 2, 
the first article is “Cancer control falls squarely within the province of the psychological 
sciences.” This article concerns topics like “evidence linking certain behaviors to cancer 
risk and outcomes” (Green McDonald et al. 2015: 61). The article is thus clearly about 
associations among particular behavioural traits and certain forms of cancer occurring in 
the minority of the population. The first article in issue 3 is “National accounts of 
subjective well-being,” which discusses associations among well-being traits and policy-
relevant factors. Issue 4, a special issue on bullying, clearly concerns trait associations. 
For example, the first article after the introduction (McDougall and Vaillancourt 2015), 
“Long-term adult outcomes of peer victimization in childhood and adolescence: 
Pathways to adjustment and maladjustment,” is about how childhood bullying traits are 
clustered with traits in adults. Issue 5 concerns lists of achievements, awards, and 
obituaries. The first article of issue 6 is about the replication crisis and the role of sample 
size and is thus less directly relevant to the issue at hand. Issue 7 is a special issue on 
mindfulness. The first article, “Conceptual and methodological issues in research on 
mindfulness and meditation,” is a methodological article that deals with issues such as 
“the nature of control and comparison conditions for research that includes mindfulness 
or other meditation-based interventions” (Davidson and Kaszniak 2015: 581). This paper 
focuses on patterns of associations among traits, in this case meditation-based 
interventions and other traits. 
While it may be that this small survey of American Psychologist is not 
representative of the whole of psychology, or the human sciences broadly considered, I 
consistently find in this and other samples of the literature studies that concern one kind 
of trait (meditating, say) and its association with other traits (like stress levels). I tend not 
to find studies that restrict their domain of inquiry to traits that the majority of humans 
possess, or traits that have an evolutionary heritage. Generalizing from this sample, I am 
confident that if we want human nature to be the subject of the human sciences, human 
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nature must concern associations among traits, not a bin of traits. The LTC account, 
therefore, to fulfils the desideratum of having human nature be the subject of the human 
sciences. Downes (2016) argues of trait cluster approaches that “their most fruitful 
contributions are not their alternate characterizations of human nature. Rather, they each 
provide alternate, evolutionarily influenced frameworks for understanding and explaining 
human variation, both of which are valuable resources for social scientists confronting 
human variation” (919). But if human nature is the subject of the human sciences, it 
appears that the LTC account is a good approach for understanding human nature, and is 
certainly better from methodological and empirical standpoints than alternative trait bin 
accounts. 
Machery and other trait bin theorists might reply that this is simply not a 
desideratum of a conception of human nature. Of the five traditional desiderata he lists in 
his (2016) article, he does not include human nature being the subject of the human 
sciences. But if human nature is disconnected from the human sciences, two problematic 
conclusions follow. One is that human nature will have arbitrary boundaries. The 50 
percent criterion of Machery seems arbitrary, and using the sciences as our guide, we 
don’t need to produce a priori boundaries like this. The second conclusion is that if 
human nature is free floating and independent of the human sciences, then we have the 
odd situation that most human scientists are not concerned with discovering human 
nature; rather, they only accidentally discover features of human nature when they 
happen to focus on the right bin of traits. Furthermore, if the sample of papers from 
American Psychologist is indicative of the human sciences, scientists very rarely study 
human nature in Machery’s nomological sense. Thus, under the nomological account, 
human nature and the subject of the human sciences are minimally overlapping. But if 
this is true, it is difficult to see what the point is of retaining the concept of human nature. 
In order to see why we should retain the concept of human nature, let’s consider other 
desiderata and whether the trait bin approach might better satisfy them. 
 
4.2. What are humans like? 
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Even if the conception of human nature that emerges from the nomological approach is 
not the subject of the human sciences, perhaps the approach is nonetheless useful for 
describing what we are like. Machery certainly thinks his account fulfils this 
desideratum: The nomological account “fulfills the descriptive function; indeed, it was 
developed to fulfill it” (2016: 214). But does his approach really do an adequate job 
characterizing human nature in this purely descriptive way? One difficulty, mentioned 
above, is that many traits of central importance to our species do not occur in the majority 
of individuals. This is true of many species. It is an important feature of chimpanzees that 
there is a status hierarchy and that there are alpha males and alpha females. This does not 
lose its importance if we realize that only a minority of chimpanzees will ever achieve 
alpha status. Another difficulty is that so much of what humans are like involves not a set 
of traits, but, as we’ve seen, the relation among traits. Just as describing a chemical 
compound by listing a bin of constituent elements will provide much less insight than 
noting how the elements are bonded to one another, so noting how human traits are 
bonded to one another and distributed over life histories is where the deep insights about 
human nature come from. 
Nevertheless, Machery holds that his nomological approach is a superior account 
in characterizing humans: 
Because the nomological notion of human nature fulfills the descriptive function, 
human nature has predictive power: It allows scientists and lay people to make 
probabilistic predictions about how people are going to behave in particular 
situations. This is [in] line with the use of the notion of human nature in the 
sciences. For instance, Gintis (2008, 1346) makes the following prediction about a 
behavioral-economics game: “Because the four subjects are strangers, the 
standard view of human nature suggests that there will be zero contributions.” 
(2016: 215) 
But is human nature as Gintis is using it a good fit with the nomological approach? 
Gintis’s paper quoted by Machery concerns economic games studying punishment and 
cooperation across cultures. Gintis claims that “the standard view holds that human 
nature has a private side in which we interact morally with a small circle of intimates and 
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a public side in which we behave as selfish maximizers” (2008: 1346). Gintis then goes 
on (in the text quoted above by Machery) to note what this standard view entails about 
how strangers should interact. He later points out that “in the many times this game has 
been played in a variety of social settings, the older view [of human nature] is virtually 
never supported” (2008: 1347). In the particular study discussed by Gintis, he points out 
that “antisocial punishment was rare in the most democratic societies and very common 
otherwise” (2008: 1346). 
In sum, Gintis offers a simple conception of human nature and notes that it is not 
born out by the data. Instead, the data show that human nature is much more complex, 
that depending on the cultural milieu, different traits will predictably appear. Exposure to 
a democratic worldview results in one set of cooperation and punishment strategies, 
while an absence of democratic exposure results in another. Human nature in this case is 
best understood in terms of a pattern of economic decision outcomes and their relation to 
prior life history traits. Such a finding about human nature is easily accommodated by the 
LTC account, but I fail to see how the nomological account has predictive power in this 
case. First, it is not clear that any one of these cooperation and punishment strategies 
exists in more than 50 percent of the world population. Second, Machery’s separation of 
human nature from culture and learning is problematic. The results discussed by Gintis 
are clearly modulated by cultural influence and social learning, yet the predictable 
associations of upbringings and economic decision outcomes help to reveal human 
nature. 
Machery (2016) uses the following case both to highlight the predictive power of 
his account, but also to criticize my trait cluster account: 
Ramsey’s notion of human nature seems to have little predictive power. Because 
every phenotype that a human being could have belongs to one of the life histories 
included within human nature, on this notion one cannot justifiably infer that a 
human being is likely to possess a trait from the fact that this trait belongs to a life 
history included within human nature. (Machery 2016: 216) 
Machery’s critique misses the point. When we make predictions about which traits an 
individual will bear, we usually do not do so in the total absence of knowledge about 
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them. Instead, we make predictions based on what other life history traits they bear. 
Following Gintis’s discussion, we would predict one form of behaviour from individuals 
in democratic societies, another from individuals in other societies. In fact, one of the 
major conclusions of Gintis’s discussion is that we need such information in order to 
make robust predictions about human behavior. Thus, the fact that human life histories 
are heterogeneous is not a problem so long as we recognize that the heterogeneity is not 
random; it follows predictable regularities and results in predictable patterns of outcomes. 
 
4.3. Causally explaining human characteristics 
At the heart of the essentialist view is the idea that each of us has within us a uniquely 
human essence. And in at least some renderings of the essentialist account, we can cite 
this essence in explaining the nature, frequency, and distribution of human traits. But do 
nonessentialist trait bin accounts or the LTC account allow for causal explanations of 
human characteristics? As Machery points out, his conception of human nature “is not 
viewed as a cause; rather, it is constituted by the outcomes of various evolutionary 
processes. . .Thus, it is unclear how the notion of human nature could underwrite causal 
explanation of human beings’ characteristics” (2016: 218). 
Machery’s account cannot causally explain outcomes, but he nevertheless holds 
that “human nature can be a causal-explanatory notion despite not being a cause” (2016: 
219). This is because, for him, human nature “is an etiological kind: All the properties of 
human beings that are included in human nature have the same etiology in that they are 
the outcomes of evolutionary processes. As is the case with other etiological kinds, 
classifying a trait as belonging to human nature is thus to endorse a particular explanatory 
sketch: It is to assert that this trait is a proper target of an ultimate explanation” (2016: 
220). In other words, because his trait bin is composed only of traits that have an 
evolutionary history, to claim that a trait is part of human nature is to claim that it has an 
evolutionary history. Thus, any causal generalizations we can make about traits with 
evolutionary histories are generalizations that we can apply to human nature traits. 
The causal explanatory power of the nomological account is rather weak, but 
Machery thinks it does a better job than the LTC account: “The causal-explanatory 
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function is largely left unfulfilled by Ramsey’s life-history trait cluster account of human 
nature. Every possible trait belongs to some life history included within human nature, 
and so asserting that a given trait is due to human nature provides no information at all. In 
this respect at least, human nature is not explanatory” (2016: 221). But Machery seems to 
be treating the LTC account as though it were a trait bin account. And he is right that if it 
were a trait bin account that included all traits, saying of a trait that it is in the human 
nature bin would carry no information. But the LTC account is a trait cluster account, not 
a trait bin account. There are therefore no traits within or outside of the human nature bin, 
since there is no such bin. Human nature consists in the relations among traits, not in 
features of a bin of traits. 
Given that the LTC account is a trait cluster account and not a trait bin account, 
we can ask whether the LTC account, properly understood, can be used to causally 
explain human characteristics. If human nature is the subject of the human sciences, then 
the generalizations about trait clusters that are unearthed by science can serve as part of 
the explanans in explanations of human characteristics. And to the degree that such 
associations are causal, explanations in terms of these associations will be causal 
explanations. For example, if meditating lowers your stress, you can cite human nature to 
account for it, since psychologists have confirmed that meditation is associated with 
lower stress. And researchers do not stop at mere associations, but try to uncover reasons 
why the associations obtain: Which causal pathways connect meditation behaviour with 
lower levels of stress? Thus, pace Machery, the LTC account not only can causally 




Accounts of human nature fall into two broad categories, trait bin and trait cluster 
accounts. Trait bin accounts consider human nature to consist of a bin of traits. Trait bin 
accounts can be essentialist, in which the human nature bin is furnished only with traits 
essential to our being human. And there are nonessentialist trait bin accounts of human 
nature, like that of Machery (2008, 2016, this volume), which define human nature as a 
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bin based on properties other than essences. 
The essentialist trait bin approaches are problematic because of the problems 
associated with attempting to maintain species essentialism in light of the nonessentialist 
contemporary phylogenetic classification system. Hull (1984) argued that the fact that 
natures are essences, and that species are not defined in terms of essences, shows that 
there is no such thing as human nature. Others have responded to this by arguing that 
there are nonessentialist trait bin or trait cluster conceptions of human nature that serve 
useful roles, and thus that the concept of human nature should not be abandoned. 
The nonessentialist trait bin approach that I considered in detail here, Machery’s 
nomological account, has merit, but bears a number of problems. The nomological 
account requires that for a trait to be included in the human nature bin, it must be 
exhibited by at least 50 percent of the members of our species. This seems rather 
arbitrary, but more importantly, it leaves out many traits that are centrally important to 
characterizing our species and distinguishing it from others. And the requirement that the 
traits have an evolutionary, not cultural, cause runs into several difficulties. But beyond 
these difficulties, it is not clear that the nomological account can fulfil core desiderata for 
human nature, such as aligning human nature with the human sciences. 
The failure of both essentialist and nonessentialist trait bin accounts motivates my 
trait cluster account of human nature, the LTC account. Trait cluster accounts hold that 
human nature lies not in which traits individual humans happen to have, but in the way 
the traits are exhibited over human life histories. In particular, traits are distributed in 
specific patterns over human life histories, and it is in these patterns where our nature 
lies. These patterns can be used to characterize humans, and the patterns of trait 
associations are precisely what the human sciences are concerned to uncover and to 
explain. Thus, if we want to retain a conception of human nature that is capable of being 





This is a preprint of a chapter whose final and definitive form is published in: E. Hannon and T. Lewens (eds) Why 
We Disagree about Human Nature, Oxford University Press. Please do not quote this version without permission. 
24 
Acknowledgments 
Thank you to Michael Deem, Hugh Desmond, Tim Lewens, and Edouard Machery for 
taking the time to carefully read and comment on earlier drafts of this chapter. This 
article was completed while I was on a National Endowment for the Humanities–
supported fellowship at the National Humanities Center. I thank the NEH and NHC for 
their support. Any views, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this 
article do not necessarily reflect those of the National Endowment for the Humanities. 
 
References 
Cashdan, E. (2013) ‘What is a human universal? Human behavioral ecology and human 
nature’, in S. M. Downes and E. Machery (eds) Arguing about Human Nature: 
Contemporary Debates, New York: Routledge, pp. 71–80. 
Chang, H. (2009) ‘We have never been whiggish (about phlogiston)’, Centaurus, 
51: 239–64. 
Davidson, R. J., and Kaszniak, A. W. (2015) ‘Conceptual and methodological issues in 
research on mindfulness and meditation’, American Psychologist, 70(7): 581–92. 
Downes, S. (2016) ‘Confronting variation in the social and behavioral sciences’, 
Philosophy of Science, 83: 909-920. 
Garland, H. (1917) A Son of the Middle Border, New York: Macmillan. 
Gintis, H. (2008) ‘Punishment and cooperation’, Science, 319: 1345–6. 
Green McDonald, P., O’Connell, M., & Suls, J. (2015) ‘Cancer control falls squarely 
within the province of the psychological sciences’, American Psychologist, 70(2): 
61–74. 
Griffiths, Paul E. (2009) ‘Reconstructing human nature’, Arts: The Journal of the Sydney 
University Arts Association, 31: 30–57. 
Hull, D. L. (1986) ‘On human nature’, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennal Meeting of the 
Philosophy of Science Association, 2: 3–13. 
Machery, E. (2008) ‘A plea for human nature’, Philosophical Psychology, 21(3): 321–29. 
This is a preprint of a chapter whose final and definitive form is published in: E. Hannon and T. Lewens (eds) Why 
We Disagree about Human Nature, Oxford University Press. Please do not quote this version without permission. 
25 
Machery, E. (this volume) ‘Doubling down on the nomological notion of human nature’, 
in E. Hannon and T. Lewens (eds), Why We Disagree About Human Nature, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 000-000. 
Machery, E., (2016) ‘Human nature’, in D. Livingstone Smith (ed.), How Biology Shapes 
Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 204-226. 
McDougall, P., & Vaillancourt, T. (2015) ‘Long-term adult outcomes of peer 
victimization in childhood and adolescence: Pathways to adjustment and 
maladjustment’, American Psychologist, 70(4): 300. 
Mithen, S. (2005) The Singing Neanderthals: The Origins of Music, Language, Mind and 
Body, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson. 
Ramsey, G. (2012) ‘How human nature can inform human enhancement: A commentary 
on Tim Lewens’s human nature: the very idea’, Philosophy & Technology, 25(4): 
479–83. 
Ramsey, G. (2013) ‘Human nature in a post-essentialist world’, Philosophy of Science, 
80(5): 983–93. 
Ramsey, G. (2017) ‘What is human nature for?’ in A. Fuentes and A. Visala (ed.) Verbs, 
Bones and Brains: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Human Nature, Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 217-230. 
Samuels, R. (2012) ‘Science and human nature’, Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Supplement, 70: 1–28. 
Schönbeck, Y., Talma, H., van Dommelen, P., Bakker, B., Buitendijk, S. E., HiraSing, R. 
A., and van Buuren, S. (2013) ‘The world’s tallest nation has stopped growing 
taller: the height of Dutch children from 1955 to 2009’, Pediatric research, 73(3): 
371–7. 
 
